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Abstract 
Margaret Thatcher was often portrayed as the "spiritual mother" of  Euroscepticism. But with 
hindsight, one can argue that Thatcher's Euroscepticism was actually limited to her vision of  Europe 
and her divisive style. Over twenty years later, David Cameron's European policy, though inspired by 
Thatcher's Euroscepticism, is now based on a clear-cut Eurosceptic agenda which is nevertheless 
criticised for being more moderate than that of  today's Eurosceptics.  
This article will first argue that although Thatcher's European agenda could hardly be assessed as 
Eurosceptic as such, it paved the way for the radicalisation of  Euroscepticism, not only as narrative but 
as a set of  actual policies towards the EU, to such an extent that it changed the dynamics of  the 
Conservative Party's structure. The article will then show how practical Euroscepticism under David 
Cameron has come to permeate party leadership in terms of  agenda-setting and party management, 
and propose tentative explanations for Eurosceptic radicalisation in the party. Finally, it will be 
suggested that over and above institutional, constitutional and ideological environmental causes, usually 
put forward as affecting Conservative attitudes to European integration today, more relevant 
explanations can be found in party organisational changes.  
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Introduction 
 The pivotal role of  Margaret Thatcher in Conservative party politics and history is such that the 
question of  her legacy is still at the heart of  political and academic debate, reactivated since her death 
on 8 April 2013. One month before his election as party leader, David Cameron summarised the 
embarrassment in which her legacy has plunged his party since she left office in November 1990 in 
these terms: "I'm certainly a big Thatcher fan, but I don't know whether that makes me a Thatcherite" (Cameron, 
BBC's newsnight, 17 November 2005, quoted in Bale, 2010: 384). Since the 1970s, scientific literature 
has had to wrestle with the nature of  social and economic changes brought about by Thatcherism, 
though scholars appeared to agree on the extent and depth of  the transformations it had generated. 
Disagreement has centered mainly on the fundamental restructuring and transformation of  the British 
State. As early as 1979, the expression "authoritarian populism" was debated, initially by Stuart Hall, 
followed by other scholars (Hall & Jacques, 1983). Since then, two aspects of  Thatcher's legacy have 
been most often posited: on the one hand, the extent to which Thatcher was deemed to have shaped an 
economic neo-liberal model which was preserved and even furthered by her successors; on the other 
hand, the impact of  her vision of  a liberal and intergovernmental Europe of  independent sovereign 
states on the British narrative of  Euroscepticism.  
 Some scholars have combined both dimensions to define Thatcherism as an "aggressive post-
imperial reassertion of  a liberal conception of  Britain as a free market society" (Gifford, 2014b: 80). Thus, in 
demonstrating the continuous strength and impact of  Thatcherism, the concept of  legacy is itself  
illuminating, shedding light retrospectively on  the bequeather (Thatcher) and also on the legatee 
(Cameron), two periods which will be compared in this article in relation to the British debate on 
European integration.  
The very notion of  Euroscepticism, first as a new word devised by the British Press (Szczerbiak 
& Taggart, 2008, vol. 2: 240) then as a social science concept constantly debated by scholars 
(Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008, vol. 1: 3-7), is regularly invoked as a shortcut to simplify the complexity 
of  Britain's relationship with the EU. From the 1990s onwards, there has indeed been an endless 
terminological debate about the notion of  Euroscepticism. A consensus seems however to have been 
reached with Szczerbiak and Taggart's authoritative definitions. Unlike hard Euroscepticism "which might 
be defined as principled opposition to the project of  European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based 
on the ceding or transfer of  powers to supranational institutions such as the EU", soft Euroscepticism suggests 
that "there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of  transferring powers to a supranational 
body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the future 
extension of  competencies that the EU is planning to make" (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008, vol. 2: 247-248). In 
the British case, Euroscepticism was often closely associated with the Conservative Party and  
Thatcherism in particular, though it also spread within the Labour Party (Forster, 2002). As Gifford 
argued, "Euroscepticism became fundamental to protecting the Thatcher legacy" (Gifford, 2014a: 519). 
 Also underlying this connection was the view that Euroscepticism had become a clear-cut 
position on European integration which could be easily identified with Margaret Thatcher herself. 
From then on, it ceased to be some sort of  vague feeling of  opposition to European integration but an 
engrained attitude which could potentially expand into a movement in itself. One could even argue that 
Euroscepticism being institutionalised became an organic component of  the pluralism within the 
Conservative Party.  
 To demonstrate this point, this article will first seek to expose a paradox in Margaret Thatcher’s 
agenda, arguing that although her European agenda could hardly be assessed as Eurosceptic as such, it 
paved the way for a radicalisation of  Euroscepticism not only as narrative but as a set of  actual policies 
in relation to the EU, to the point of  changing the dynamics of  the Conservative Party's structure. The 
article will then show how Euroscepticism under David Cameron has come to permeate party 
leadership in terms of  agenda-setting and party management and propose tentative explanations for the 
Eurosceptic radicalisation within the party. The article will suggest that over and above institutional, 
constitutional and ideological environmental causes, usually put forward as affecting Conservative 
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attitudes to European integration, more relevant explanations, overlooked by scholars, can be found in 
party organisational changes.  
 
The enigma of Thatcher's European agenda  
 
 To understand the issue of  Margaret Thatcher's European legacy, it is essential to have a clear 
vision of  her European agenda, which, with hindsight, has always been a complex question. Firstly, her 
agenda only became clearer at the end of  her last term, that is after the 1988 Bruges speech when she 
finally expounded her vision, eventually felt as being at odds with the official position on Europe of  the 
party, still dubbed the "party of  Europe" (Alexandre-Collier, 2002a). Secondly, the very issue of  her 
European agenda is multi-layered, containing as it does two levels of  interpretation: on the one hand, a 
symbolic / rhetorical level can be noted when her vision of  Europe is referred to in more abstract 
terms; on the other hand, there is a political level when her actions and actual policies are considered. 
The complexity of  Thatcher's European agenda could be explained by an unprecedented discrepancy 
between the two levels, to such an extent that there was even talk of  a "schizophrenic attitude to the 
European project" (Daddow, 2013: 217) or, in other words, a dichotomy between theory and practice 
which makes Thatcher's European agenda still very difficult to decipher. 
 Arguably, her vision of  Europe outlined in the Bruges speech in 1988 was quite clearly that of  a 
liberal, intergovernmental Europe, in which Britain could remain a free and independent country. 
Furthermore, Gifford explained how this vision was constructed on a number of  oppositions between 
Britain and Europe: "European bureaucracy and political formalism versus British pragmatism and 
democracy; British free trade liberalism versus European protectionism; British globalism versus 
narrow Europeanism and British political stability versus European instability" (Gifford, 2014b: 97). 
Thatcher's rhetorical Euroscepticism was also substantiated by her diplomatic style, well illustrated by 
her attitude at the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984 when she famously negotiated a rebate on the British 
contribution to the EU budget. More significantly, it was revealed by her determination to oppose 
membership of  the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of  the European Monetary System, at all costs, 
at least until October 1990, a decision which alienated some of  the members of  her Cabinet including 
Geoffrey Howe who eventually resigned. 
 In the meantime, the reality of  her actions and policies was fundamentally different, as illustrated 
by several examples. In 1986, she signed the Single European Act, drafted by the European 
Commissioner Lord Cockfield who had been one of  her ministers. She later wrote in her memoirs: "I 
was pleased with what had been achieved. We were on course for the Single Market by 1992. I had to make relatively few 
compromises as regards wording; I had surrendered no important interest; I had to place a reservation on just one aspect 
of  social policy in the Treaty" (Thatcher, 1993: 555), putting all the blame on Lord Cockfield for his 
inconsistency: "Unfortunately," she argued, "he tended to disregard the larger questions of  politics – constitutional 
sovereignty, national sentiment and the promptings of  liberty. He was the prisoner as well as the master of  his subject. It 
was all too easy for him, therefore, to go native and to move from deregulating the market to reregulating it under the 
rubric of  harmonization" (Thatcher, 1993: 547). She truly believed, as Hugo Young suggested, that the 
Single European Act was "Thatcherism on a European scale" (Young, 1998: 333) and by focusing on the 
economic dimension, she underestimated the institutional mechanisms that would be necessary to 
promote common policies in a wider range of  areas. In addition, even though she had initially opposed 
membership of  the ERM, she finally agreed to the principle of  entry, as divisions in her Cabinet made 
her resistance eventually untenable and forced her to capitulate under the persuasive alliance of  
Douglas Hurd, Foreign Secretary and John Major, her new Chancellor of  the Exchequer (Gifford, 
2014b: 98). 
 Building on Szczerbiak and Taggart's definitions of  Euroscepticism, the comparison between 
Thatcher's vision and determination with the reality of  her European policies challenges the very idea 
of  Thatcher's so-called "soft" Euroscepticism which, this article argues, was eventually more a question 
of  style than of  substance (Alexandre-Collier & Avril, 2013: 33-35). With hindsight, it is clear that her 
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Eurosceptic legacy has more to do with ideas than policies and that her views on Europe have been 
gradually built up since her demise, to the point of  creating the political myth that she has become 
(Fontana & Parsons, 2015). If  one describes Euroscepticism not only as being reluctant to go along 
with European integration but also as a form of  opposition to the idea itself, ranging from moderate 
opposition to some aspects of  European integration (soft) to outright hostility to Britain's membership 
of  the EEC (hard), the label hardly applies to Margaret Thatcher. If  one understands Euroscepticism 
as a euphemism for opposition to the EU, which is certainly the closest to what it actually means today, 
the truth is that it was only after Thatcher left office that she became a Eurosceptic as such and that 
Thatcherism became synonymous with Euroscepticism, and it was also only after her departure that 
Euroscepticism developed. Much has been written about the ratification of  the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992-93 (Alexandre-Collier, 2002b; Baker et al., 1993 a, 1993b, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2008; Forster, 2002; 
Gifford, 2014b). This episode was indeed the 'watershed' moment (Forster, 2002: 8) when 
Euroscepticism was gradually to become an organised movement both in and outside Parliament 
(Usherwood, 2002; Gifford, 2014 a & b), with for example the emergence of  the Bruges group, 
described as "one of  the most important guardians of  the Thatcher shrine" (Vinen, 2009: 230). From both the 
Thatcher and post-Thatcher periods, the term Eurosceptic has come to refer not only to an attitude but 
also to a form of  parliamentary behaviour (Alexandre-Collier, 2002b) and, indeed, to a movement in its 
own right. 
Cameron's practical Euroscepticism 
 
 Today, relevant similarities can be found between David Cameron's and Margaret Thatcher's 
approaches to the EU. But these similarities have more to do with the rhetoric used by both leaders  
and its divisive impact on the parliamentary party. The Bloomberg speech delivered by David Cameron 
in January 2013 is clearly a perfect example of  the mark left by Thatcher's vision of  Europe when he 
advocates: "a flexible, adaptable and open EU", arguing that "We come to the EU with a frame of  mind that is 
more practical than emotional", an echo of  the Bruges speech "The community is not an end in itself. Nor is it an 
institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of  some abstract intellectual concept". 
 Party divisions are also a common denominator, as pluralism has always been an intrinsic 
feature of  the Conservative parliamentary party. Divisions on the European issue have come to be seen 
as a deeply engrained yet fluctuating phenomenon (Alexandre-Collier, 2010: 27-45; Lynch & Whitaker, 
2013b). Although the party's agenda has changed radically since the 1980s, MPs’ perception today of  
party tensions on Europe as being generated by Cameron's attitude, is a situation that both leaders have 
experienced. The difference, though, is that Cameron is viewed as being too moderate compared with 
the rest of  the parliamentary party, whereas Thatcher was viewed as too radical. While Margaret 
Thatcher’s position generated discontent among the pro-European members of  her Cabinet and led to 
Geoffrey Howe’s resignation, David Cameron’s agenda triggered negative reactions from the most 
Eurosceptic elements on the Conservative back benches, the first example being that of  David Nuttall, 
a newly elected Conservative MP. He introduced a petition demanding a referendum on Britain's 
membership of  the EU, which eventually led to an unprecedented rebellion of  81 Conservative MPs in 
October 2011, 49 of  whom had been elected in 2010 (Gifford, 2014b; Lynch et Whitaker, 2013a). 
 The comparison between Thatcher and Cameron, however, ends here. Differences between 
their attitudes to European integration are far more significant than the traces of  Thatcherism still to 
be detected in Cameron's rhetoric. First of  all, the parliamentary party has changed radically since 1990. 
Thirteen years in opposition paved the way for a complete generational renewal (Criddle, 2010) with the 
election of  younger and more Eurosceptic MPs (Heppell, 2013) who "regard Euroscepticism as a given 
rather than a touchstone and (...) admire Thatcher without worshipping her" (Bale, 2010: 379). As a generation 
who for the most part grew up under Thatcher, the majority of  MPs elected in 2010 are familiar with 
nothing else but the party's history of  internal passions and frictions over the EU. As Bale and Gruber 
recently argued, "the Tories’ strategy on the question of  EU integration has evolved into a drama of  its own" 
(Gruber & Bale, 2014: 214). As already shown, the 'watershed' moment (Forster, 2008: 8) was the 
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ratification of  the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93, under the premiership of  John Major, and the setting 
up of  political, economic and monetary union. From then on, the party has been so divided that 
Conservative tensions on European integration have almost become a textbook case. 
 When the Conservative Party was elected in May 2010 and formed a coalition government with 
the Liberal Democrats, the party's European agenda was, as a result, radically different from what it had 
been in the 1980s and 1990s. At that time, the main bone of  contention was the prospect of  political, 
economic and monetary Union leading presumably to a federal union - or the "F-Word" - rejected 
outright by Conservative Eurosceptics (Alexandre-Collier 2002a: 82). A climax had been reached in 
2001 when the party in opposition objected to the pound joining the eurozone officially and 
permanently (Alexandre-Collier, 2010: 27-45). Today, membership of  the EU has become the main 
divisive issue with the prospect of  a referendum by 20171. Since David Cameron’s election as party 
leader in December 2005, the Conservatives have launched a series of  initiatives and policies 
representing a clear turning point in the party's European strategy. One example is the decision to leave 
the European People's Party in the European Parliament in June 2009 and to set up a new group 
known as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) together with the Czech and Polish 
Conservative parties, a move sometimes criticised as verging on populist (Alexandre-Collier, 2010: 76-
77). A second example is David Cameron’s refusal to join the European Stability Mechanism and Euro 
Plus Pact, and the fact that he did not sign the Treaty known as the "fiscal compact". In Brussels, the 
Prime Minister justified his bold decision by declaring: "Margaret Thatcher never vetoed a treaty – I vetoed a 
treaty upstairs on the eighth floor of  this building" (Dominiczak & Waterfield, 2014). A third example is to be 
found with the 2010 EU Bill which became the basis for the largest rebellion ever by Conservatives on 
Europe, even though it contained three commitments which could have been seen as significant 
Eurosceptic moves: "first, the referendum lock which required that any future treaties transferring 
national powers to European level be subject to a referendum; second, significant transfers of  power 
without any treaty change, so called 'ratchet clauses', may also be subject to a referendum; third, a 
sovereignty clause" (attempting to state the supremacy of  British Parliament with regard to EU law) 
(Gifford, 2014b: 156; for further analysis, see also Gifford 2014b: 155-170). 
 The EU agenda of  the present government indicates a major shift from what could be seen as 
theoretical Euroscepticism to practical Euroscepticism. As will be argued later, this means not only 
nurturing the seeds which Margaret Thatcher had planted only in the very last years of  her Premiership 
but going even further than anything that she could ever have imagined. The result is that today so-
called Euroscepticism as an attitude to European integration has become the party's official EU stance. 
But if  since Maastricht the word Eurosceptic had come to mean a form of  parliamentary behaviour 
with reference to parliamentary rebels (Alexandre-Collier, 2002b), the meaning is now totally different 
as today's so-called Eurosceptics - or rebels - are clearly anti-EU, while what are known as the 
"Eurorealists" are more comparable with yesterday's Eurosceptics. 
 
Explaining practical Euroscepticism 
 
 Explaining the spread of  Euroscepticism in the Conservative party leadership requires a rapid 
but necessary foray into sociological theory so as to avoid cultural and political clichés. Leaving aside 
the "agency" approach to political leadership, which explains leaders’ choices as being guided only by 
their individual desires, and which therefore runs the risk of  providing simplistic psychological 
explanations, we posit that with political leaders being heavily dependent on "structures"2, the recent 
institutional and political structural changes in the UK shed light on the rapid development of  
Euroscepticism in but also around David Cameron and the shift from theoretical to practical 
                                                 
1  The referendum will be effectively held after a period of renegotiation with the EU and if the Conservatives win an 
overall majority at the May 2015 general election. 
2  On the commonly used structure/agency duality, see for example Turner, 2006: 357-358. 
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Euroscepticism since the 1980s. In line with the neo-institutionalist approach, whereby institutions 
constrain the elites’ preferences and actions, we contend that various kinds of  institutional pressures at 
all levels (supra, national but also sub-national) have converged towards the idea that the UK's 
institutional landscape has considerably changed. From this theoretical perspective, both external and 
contextual factors can be advanced to explain the surge of  practical Euroscepticism. 
 As in the 1980s, the European Union, as an intricate institutional entity, remains difficult to 
decipher. Not only is it still an "unidentified political object", as Jacques Delors argued in 1989, but it is 
also a moving target. Arguably, the 2008 financial crisis has radically changed perceptions, so that Brexit 
(British exit), which was still taboo in the 1990s, has today become a realistic option with opinion polls 
showing public opinion to be divided on the issue3. Furthermore, the spread of  Euroscepticism can be 
explained by a network of  structural changes in the UK, which can be described as constitutional, 
institutional and party systemic. With regard to constitutional and institutional changes, the principle of  
parliamentary sovereignty has been under increasing pressure from both European integration and 
devolution, which should be conceived as interrelated processes. The result has been an extensive 
debate on the integrity of  the UK as a nation-state. In addition, multi-level governance as a result of  
European integration and devolution has had a major impact on the subsequent weakening of  
Westminster in terms of  decision-making and the need, first expressed by New Labour's government, 
to empower individuals and bring them closer to the locus of  power. Creating devolved assemblies or 
consulting people directly became the main instruments of  this constitutional agenda. From then on, 
the recurrent use of  referenda has substantiated this constitutional evolution. Since Tony Blair and his 
buzzword of  empowerment, the practice of  power has clearly changed, with Britain's parliamentary 
democracy no longer appearing to be incompatible with tools of  direct democracy. The New Labour 
governments thus opened a cycle which Cameron has been eager to continue, with the referendum on 
Alternative Voting in May 2011, on Scottish independence on 18 September 2014 and the future 
referendum on EU membership by 2017, distancing himself  totally from Thatcher's denunciation in 
1975 of  the referendum as, quoting Clement Attlee, a "splendid weapon for dictators and demagogues"4. This 
new practice of  government is in line with an increasing tendency to externalise the debate 
(Usherwood, 2002) in the case of  divisive issues, while empowering voters and supporters in the 
Blairite tradition.  
 Changes in the party system also provide another structural explanation: the party system is 
more fragmented today (Cowley, 2011), as illustrated by the government status of  the Liberal 
Democrats and the rise of  UKIP, both of  which could also be seen as relevant factors to account for 
the spread of  Euroscepticism. The presence of  the Liberal Democrats in the coalition government has 
certainly caused resentment in Conservative ranks. But more importantly, the growing popularity of  
UKIP has created a new ideological environment since this party now represents a direct threat to the 
Conservative Party, not necessarily in terms of  votes (because of  the First-Past-The-Post system) but 
because more Conservative MPs might now consider defecting to UKIP, following the examples of  
Douglas Carswell, on 28 August 2014, and Mark Reckless, on 27 September 2014 (Lynch & Whitaker, 
2013a; Ford & Goodwin, 2014). 
 In addition to these structural changes, a new approach should be considered to account for 
this evolution by examining the way the internal organisation of  the Conservative Party has also 
radically changed over recent years. Although scientific literature seems to plead for a more holistic 
approach to Euroscepticism by treating it as an independent variable (Vasilopoulou, 2013), this article 
argues that the study of  Euroscepticism as a variable which remains nevertheless highly dependent on 
party competition and structure, provides, a closer analysis and understanding of  present-day 
Conservative Euroscepticism and the actual impact of  the Thatcherite legacy on the party’s EU agenda. 
                                                 
3  While an opinion poll conducted by Opinium/The Observer on 4-7 November 2014 showed that 40% would be in 
favour of staying in, 43% against and 17% still unsure, later opinion polls conducted in early 2015 show that more 
than 50% would be in favour of staying in (57% compared with 21% against and 17% unsure, according to a 
YouGov/Sun poll conducted on 22 and 23 February 2015).  
4  Margaret Thatcher, House of Commons speech, Hansard HC 888/304-17, 11 March 1975. 
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We contend that party organisational changes may offer a new and fruitful perspective to explain the 
shift from theoretical (under Thatcher) to practical Euroscepticism (under Cameron). This perspective 
provides strong arguments to explain not only the spread of  Euroscepticism but how in Britain a new 
form of  populism has come to permeate the whole Conservative party agenda and structure (Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2012; Rosanvallon, 2011). Although this question of  the temptation of  populism in 
Cameron's style of  leadership has already been discussed elsewhere (Higgins, 2013; Alexandre-Collier, 
2015a), it remains an issue worthy of  further reflexion. The radical changes in terms of  party 
management and organisational reforms should be examined more closely from the perspective of  the 
cartel party thesis (Katz & Mair, 1995, 1997, 2009) suggesting a process of  transformation which 
combines depoliticisation and professionalisation comparable with what has been at work in the 
Conservative Party. Organisational changes are not new, dating back to William Hague’s reforms 
introduced in 1998 (Hague, 1997). These reforms concerned mainly the leadership election, with the 
introduction of  a postal ballot for party members. With a view to democratising party organisation 
(Katz, 2001) and promoting inclusiveness, the reforms included the participation of  party members in 
the leadership contest and the multiplication of  focus groups and internal referenda to give them more 
sway. It also provided the party with a full constitution around which the three components of  the 
party (parliamentary, professional and volunteer) could unite under the auspices of  a new overarching 
party board with only 5 members elected by the National Convention. Commentators noted how these 
organisational changes only served to reveal the continuing authority of  a hidden oligarchy behind the 
facade of  enhanced democratisation (Kelly, 2003: 102-103). Others further argued that the 1998 
reforms represented a shift in the party’s balance of  powers (Bale & Turner, 2012), with the leader 
propelled to the top of  a huge structure codified by the party constitution (Webb, 2000) and the 
apparent "bottom-up" strategies only serving to galvanise the "top-down" mentality style presiding over 
the party (Kelly, 2003: 102).  
 In capitalising on these reforms, David Cameron extended them even further and thus paved 
the way for an even more radical shift in the party balance of  powers, with a leader who is now more 
dependent on the party's rank-and-file and grassroots. From this perspective, changes in the leadership 
election are particularly enlightening. Under Thatcher and since 1965, when the leadership election was 
democratised to encompass the MPs' votes in the process, a leader's survival had depended only on 
MPs: in November 1990 Thatcher herself  lost the first round of  voting by only 4 votes meaning that 
she did not get the majority required plus 15%. To some extent, although the leader was no longer 
"chosen" but was elected by MPs, this famous example is still revealing of  the then overwhelming 
power of  MPs, as the structure was still based on the oligarchic model (Michels, 1915, 1968) inherited 
from the pre-1965 period, of  the "magic circle", following a "chain of  responsibility" (McKenzie 1955: 
588) from the leader, the MPs to the voters (Webb, 1994). It was later revealed that in the run-up to the 
1990 leadership contest, MPs had not been sufficiently canvassed (Bale, 2010: 27, 29) and the 
responsibility for this strategic error was often placed on one person: Peter Morrison, the Prime 
Minister’s Private Parliamentary Secretary and Chairman of  the 1922 Committee, the Conservative 
backbenchers’ organisation. Margaret Thatcher wrote that "unfortunately, the same quality of  serene optimism 
which made Peter so effective at cheering us all up was not necessarily so suitable for calculating the intentions of  that most 
slippery of  electorates – Conservative MPs" (Thatcher, 1993: 837). Norman Lamont, then Chief  Secretary to 
the Treasury, even suggested that MPs’ independence was treated like a protected territory and that, 
given his determination not to interfere and his overconfidence, Morrison’s unhelpfulness may even 
have been intentional: "Several times, I rang Peter Morrison, her Campaign Manager, MP for Chester, and offered 
to call any wavering backbenchers. Trying to get names from him was like extracting blood from a stone" (Lamont, 
1999: 10) (see also Clark, 1999[1993]: 354-355). 
 In 1998, the election of  the leader was further democratised, including a final postal ballot by all 
members of  the party. This was a major change which signalled the end of  a form of  backbench 
domination over party organisation, though MPs retained key prerogatives, such as the right to remove 
a leader through a vote of  confidence (Alderman, 1999: 268). Cameron benefitted from the new rules 
of  the leadership election, as he was himself  eventually chosen by party members while MPs were more 
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divided between him and David Davis (Alexandre-Collier, 2010: 17). This reform clearly changed the 
balance of  power in the party by making the leader more sensitive to the grassroots' needs and wishes 
and therefore more vulnerable to them, thus exposing the whole party to the risk of  populism. But 
David Cameron then went further and extended organisational reforms to the way parliamentary 
candidates are selected, introducing two innovative devices intended to make the party organisation 
more inclusive and democratic: the priority list or "A-list" in 2006 (including at least 50% of  women 
and ethnic minorities) (McIlveen, 2009; Hill, 2013) and open primaries, where the ballot is open to any 
voter regardless of  their party preferences and which were organised as early as 2003, before his 
election as party leader, but then considerably extended after 2005 to over a hundred constituencies. 
Two types of  open primaries were introduced: primary meetings and all-postal open primaries. Since 
2003, primary meetings had already been organised in more than a hundred constituencies (Criddle, 
2010: 315) but only three all-postal primaries were introduced, first in Totnes and Gosport in 20095 
(with significant turnouts of  24.5% and 17.7% for Totnes and Gosport), following the MPs' expenses 
scandals of  May, and then in Rochester and Strood in 2014, thus projecting an image of  internal 
democratisation which does not necessarily correspond with reality (Alexandre-Collier 2015b). In their 
model of  the cartel party, Katz and Mair had already suggested that future party transformations, 
necessary to overcome the inevitable collapse in party membership and party dealignment (Dalton & 
Wattenberg, 2002), would require innovative strategies but result in blurring the boundaries between 
members and non-members (Katz & Mair 1995, 1997 & 2009). Katz's thesis of  candidate selection as 
applied to the cartel party model indeed posited that by creating a direct relation between voters and 
candidates, open primaries undermine the influence of  sub-units such as local party associations, and 
alter the distribution of  power, but also create an illusion of  democracy with voters empowered at the 
expense of  party members, and party leadership closely controlling the whole process (Katz, 2001). 
The actual result has indeed been more centralisation around the leader who effectively controls the 
whole process and this enables him to bypass party intermediaries in order to gain more direct access to 
the grassroots. Based on the assumption that these grassroots are more Eurosceptic, Euroscepticism, as 
a consequence, has come to permeate the whole party structure, from bottom to top, with party leaders 
and MPs responding, in return, to this grassroots' pressure. More than simply proving Eurosceptic 
radicalisation, party organisational changes therefore illustrate the way in which the practice of  power 
has changed, with a leader more inclined to please the grassroots when faced with the threat of  voters 
turning to UKIP in the event of  the party failing to deliver on Europe. The new rules for candidate 
selection reveal the new face of  a party leadership which is less impervious to grassroots’ pressure 
(voters and public opinion), at the expense of  party members, and is perhaps more sensitive to the risk 
of  populism, with a leader also more willing to yield to this pressure when threatened by internal 
divisions (Europe) or external challengers (UKIP) (Alexandre-Collier, 2015a & b). 
 
Conclusion  
To some extent, David Cameron has now reached far beyond Margaret Thatcher's expectations, 
fulfilling or rather implementing her dreams. With a referendum on Brexit, Cameron may offer a softer 
version of  what most so-called Eurosceptics now advocate. Yet, the likelihood of  his campaigning for 
Brexit in the future referendum, though excluded for the time being, would distance him even further 
from the Thatcherite legacy regarding the continuum of  Euroscepticism.  
Compelling explanations are to be found in the network of  institutional and party systemic factors 
which account for both the spread of  Europeanisation and subsequent Euroscepticism at national 
level. From the Thatcher years up to the present time, it is easy to measure the impact of  the 
constitutional and institutional changes brought about by European integration. But as far as the 
                                                 
5 Since then, there has been just one all-postal open primary in Rochester and Strood, to select the new prospective 
candidate for the Conservative Party in the by-election of 20 November 2014 following the defection of 
Conservative MP Mark Reckless to UKIP. 
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Conservative Party itself  is concerned, the spread of  Euroscepticism, following on from Thatcher’s 
rhetorical position but also as a phenomenon in itself, distinct from the set of  policies she promoted or 
defended, also stems from radical changes in the balance of  power between the various components of  
the party’s organisation. Still powerful, the leader is at the top of  a pyramid,  reminiscent of  McKenzie’s 
oligarchic description. Yet the conditions of  his/her ascension have changed, as has their capacity to 
respond to this evolution: while Margaret Thatcher’s fate depended solely on the parliamentary party, 
David Cameron is now more receptive to grassroots pressure and more sensitive to populism. As one 
of  its major effects, the spread of  Euroscepticism can indeed be studied as indicative of  how much the 
party has changed after Thatcher. Conservative MPs are now much bolder and more independent of  
their leader, but also more dependent than ever on their voters, to the extent of  being tempted by 
populism. Party organisational changes have therefore paved the way for Euroscepticism to permeate 
the whole party structure, with the party leadership now being urged to respond more emotively to the 
temptation of  populism, far less cautiously in fact than Margaret Thatcher. 
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